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This study investigates the determinants of the U.S. divorce rate from 1929 to 2006, with 
particular emphasis on explaining its surge in the mid-1960s.  The main finding is that the 
divorce rate and female labor-force participation, or equivalently female participation in higher 
education, are endogenous variables that are linked by a negative, long-run relationship. The 
availability of oral contraception shifted this negative relationship to a new, higher level of 
divorce rates during the late-1960s and early-1970s. The Vietnam War also contributed to the 
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1   Introduction 
The steady rise in the United States (U.S.) divorce rate from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s has 
been a topic of much debate among demographers and economists (Michael 1978; Ruggles 
1997; Friedberg 1998; Goldstein 1999; Wolfers 2006). Researchers have focused on explaining 
the evolution of the divorce rate primarily by changes in the female labor-force participation rate 
(FLFPR) and in divorce laws. However, there is sufficient evidence that causality may run from 
divorce to a rise in the FLFPR as opposed to the other way around (Johnson and Skinner 1986; 
Sen 2002) and recent research on unilateral divorce laws indicates only a small, transitory impact 
on divorce rates (Wolfers 2006). Based on the most recent evidence, it appears that the rather 
drastic changes in the observed divorce rate over time are still awaiting an explanation. 
The purpose of this study is to provide some new empirical evidence on the likely causes of 
the surge in the divorce rate during the 1960s by extending the literature in a number of ways. 
First and foremost, we argue, similar to Wolfers (2006), that it is impossible to understand the 
mid-60s surge in the divorce rate without looking significantly beyond this time period. The 
long-run driving forces of the divorce rate need to be captured before one can reasonably debate 
the causes of sudden changes, such as those experienced in the mid-1960s. For that purpose, we 
extend the analysis back to 1929. Second, we bring to bear on the data a number of likely causal 
factors for the 1960s surge in divorce rates that have been discussed in separate studies but have 
apparently not been combined in one study. In particular, we consider the legal availability of 
oral contraceptives, divorce law changes, the likely impact of the Vietnam War, and 
macroeconomic factors.   
Our key result pertains to the long-run relationship between the FLFPR, or our proxy for it, 
female participation in higher education, and the divorce rate. We show that the uncertainty 
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about the direction of causality is likely the result of discounting the possibility that the FLFPR 
and divorce rates are jointly determined. More importantly, we demonstrate that the commonly 
accepted notion that the divorce rate and the FLFPR are positively related stems from the fact 
that previous studies have been too narrowly focused on the years of interest, that is, the 1960s 
and 1970s. By extending the sample back to 1929, we are able to identify a strong, negative 
relationship between the divorce rate and the FLFPR or its proxy, female participation in higher 
education.  The years from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, which are marked by the diffusion 
of oral-contraceptives, divorce law changes, and the Vietnam War, shift the negative relationship 
between divorce rate and the FLFPR, which exists before the mid-1960s and again after the mid-
1970s, toward a higher level of both the divorce rate and the FLFPR.     
We find that the econometric evidence provided by the U.S. time-series data is not strong 
enough to identify separately the impact of divorce-law reform and the impact of increased 
access to the ―pill‖ on the U.S. divorce rate.  This is not surprising as both changes were 
implemented in many states at about the same time toward the end of the 1960s and early-1970s. 
However, by relying on the evidence presented in previous research, inter alia Smith (1997) and 
Wolfers (2006), we conclude that the availability of oral contraception is the more likely causal 
factor for the rise in the U.S. divorce rate than divorce law changes. The Vietnam War is shown 
to also have had a very significant impact on the U.S. divorce rate.   
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the key variables used in the analysis and their time-series behavior.  In the same 
section, we also discuss previous work on each of these variables and the theoretical impact that 
we expect these covariates to have on the divorce rate.  Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and the 
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econometric methodology, respectively.  Section 5 presents our findings.  Section 6 provides a 
brief summary and some concluding remarks.   
 
2   Institutional Framework and Empirical Regularities 
2.1  Female Participation in the Labor-Force and in Higher Education 
A number of researchers have analyzed the impact of the rising economic independence of 
women on the rise in the divorce rate (e.g., Bremmer and Kesselring 2004; Nunley 2008).  
Economic independence is typically associated with increases in the FLFPR or in the 
participation of females in higher education.   
Using the FLFPR as a proxy for women’s rising economic independence may not be ideal 
because until the late-1960s and 1970s many women remained secondary earners within 
households, continued to take their husband’s labor-market choices as given, and worked part 
time with little opportunity for on-the-job advancement (Goldin 2006).  Similar to the FLFPR, 
female participation in higher education has grown steadily since the late-1940s.
1
  Over this 
period, Goldin et al. (2006) document how the rate of females taking math and science courses in 
high school converged to that of men.  This better prepared them for college and supplied the 
necessary skills to sort into professionalized fields of study, such as medical, law, business, and 
dental schools.  As women increased their economic independence through participation in 
professional jobs, household labor-market decisions became interdependent, perhaps indicating a 
shift in bargaining power toward women within households (Costa 2000).  The gain in 
bargaining power from increased participation in professionalized fields suggests that female 
participation in higher education proxies well for the rising economic independence of women. 
                                               
1 The percentage of female participation in higher education rose from the late-1930s to the early WWII years, 
but it fell substantially following the war’s end, when many war veterans began attending college because of 
incentives created by the GI bill (Figure 2) (Goldin et al. 2006).   
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The theoretical relationship between female participation in higher education and the 
divorce rate is not clear.  Becker’s (1973, 1974) traditional family model posits separate spheres 
for husbands and wives, suggesting that spouses should specialize in the sphere in which they 
have a comparative advantage.  If spouses choose to specialize in the same sphere, for example 
market work, the traditional family model predicts a decline in the returns from marriage.  
However, the advent of labor-saving technologies and the ability to purchase household services 
in the market could mean that the traditional model of household behavior no longer applies 
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).  As such, both spouses participating in the labor market, 
especially if both spouses work in professional fields, may allow greater returns from marriage 
through increased efficiency from household technologies, purchases of household services, and 
increases in consumption and leisure.  In this sense, there could be returns from marriage when 
both spouses work, which could reduce divorce rates.   
Previous empirical work on the relationship between the divorce rate and the FLFPR or 
female participation in higher education centers on the 1960s and 1970s and finds a positive 
association (e.g., Bremmer and Kesselring 2004; Nunley 2008).  However, interpreting this as 
causation may be problematic because a comparison of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that both the 
FLFPR and female participation in higher education began to increase well before the dramatic 
rise in the divorce rate in the mid-1960s and 1970s.
2
  Figure 3, which covers the years 1929 to 
2006, illustrates why a positive, long-run relationship can easily be found between female 
participation in higher education and the divorce rate: the least-squares-regression line through 
the scatter plot of Figure 3 has a distinct, positive slope. However, Figure 3 also indicates two 
strong, negative relationships between the divorce rate and female participation in higher 
                                               
2 Likewise, identifying the effect of the FLFPR on the divorce rate has also proven to be difficult because there 
is evidence suggesting that the two variables may be simultaneously determined (Johnson and Skinner 1986; Sen 
2002; Bremmer and Kesselring 2004).   
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education, one prior to 1965 (excluding the WWII years) and one from the mid-1970s onward.  
The negative relationships for these time spans are presented separately in Figures 4 and 5, with 
each figure containing a least-squares-regression line. Since Figures 4 and 5 contain together the 
vast majority of the data points of the 1929 to 2006 time period, they are highly suggestive of a 
negative, long-run relationship between the divorce rate and female participation in higher 
education or in the labor force.  
The time period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s appears akin to a transitional period in 
Figure 3: a period in which the divorce rate permanently shifted upward to a higher level.
3
 What 
appears clear from Figure 3 is that the rise in the divorce rate over this time period cannot be 
traced to the increase in female participation in higher education or in the labor force. Other 
factors that affected family life over this period are more likely to be the driving forces behind 
the sharp increase in the divorce rate. They are discussed next.  
 
2.2   The Transitional Period: the Mid-1960s to the Mid-1970s 
Over the period of rising divorce rates, a number of legal, social, and economic changes took 
effect: general access to oral contraception, divorce law changes, the Vietnam War, and 
increased variability in standard macroeconomic variables. Although their effects on the 
incidence of divorce have been studied extensively, we include them in our analysis to help 
uncover the influence of female participation in higher education.   
Goldin and Katz (2000, 2002) find that access to the pill increased women’s age at marriage, 
which can improve marital sorting through a reduction in the opportunity costs of postponing 
marriage.  Increases in marriage-match quality have the potential to reduce divorce rates. In fact, 
                                               
3 We note that WWII also shifted the divorce rate to a higher level. This is visible from Figure 1. However, this 
shift was clearly temporary and, therefore, different from the events from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s. 
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Goldin and Katz (2002) find a negative effect of access to oral contraceptives on the divorce 
probabilities of college-educated women.  However, there is also credible empirical evidence of 
a positive effect of access to the pill on divorce rates.  Using time-series data from England and 
Wales, Smith (1997) shows that access to oral contraceptives increased the divorce rate in both 
regions.   
Access to the pill could have a positive effect on the divorce rate for several reasons.  First, 
the advent of the pill allowed women to participate in market work at higher rates (Bailey 2006) 
and permitted college-educated women to enter professional fields (Goldin and Katz 2000, 
2002).  In the traditional family model, an increase in market work for wives, with no change in 
husbands’ time allocated to the labor market, leads to a decline in the returns from marriage. 
Second, the pill reduces fertility (Bailey 2006).  It is well established that increases in marriage-
specific capital, such as children, decrease the risk of divorce (Becker et al. 1977).  Third, 
individuals may sort into ―bad‖ marriages, as they can delay fertility.  Prospective spouses may 
sort into riskier marriages because the costs of divorce are lower when fertility can be controlled.   
Figure 6 provides a scatterplot of the percentage of the population affected by access to oral 
contraceptives and the divorce rate.  It shows that the two variables are positively related over 
the time period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. However, the points for the years 1968-
1971 are above the fitted trend line, an indication that another force was at work during this time.  
These years coincide with the heightened intensity of the Vietnam War, which may have shifted 
the divorce rate to an elevated level above and beyond what can be attributed to the use of oral 
contraceptives.  
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Studies that examine the impact of major wars on the divorce rate use time-specific, indicator 
variables to capture these effects (South 1985; Anderson and Little 1999).
4
  South (1985) finds 
that the divorce rate increased during the Vietnam War period, but no statistical evidence links 
the Korean War to the divorce rate.  By contrast, no relationship is identified between the divorce 
rate and the Vietnam War years by Anderson and Little (1999), but they substantiate South’s 
(1985) results for the Korean War. Anderson and Little (1999) also establish a statistically 
significant, positive effect of the WWII years on the divorce rate.  
The period of the rising divorce rate also coincided with the adoption of unilateral divorce 
laws, which provided unrestricted access to divorce for either spouse.
5
  The impact of divorce-
law changes on divorce rates has been studied extensively (e.g., see Friedberg 1998; Gruber 
2004; Wolfers 2006).  The majority of studies identify a small, transitory, positive effect of 
unilateral divorce laws on divorce rates.   
Concomitant with the rise in divorce, there was increased variability in macroeconomic 
conditions.  The literature seems to have reached some consensus on the relationship between 
economic growth and divorce rates.  Divorce rates tend to rise during economic expansions and 
decline during economic contractions (e.g., see Nunley 2008).  In the context of the traditional 
marriage model, economic growth may create an incentive for spouses who specialize in home 
production to participate in market work.   As a result, the returns from marriage decline, which 
could increase the divorce rate.  
Another macroeconomic indicator that has been shown to have sizable, persistent, and 
positive effects on the divorce rate is the inflation rate (Nunley 2008).  An increase in the 
                                               
4
 Typically, major wars and their impact are not captured in numerical form.  Most of the time, the war years 
are left out of empirical work completely or they are absorbed, but not explained, with a set of indicator variables 
(e.g., see South 1985; Anderson and Little 1999).   
5 Proof of marital wrongdoing or mutual consent was required by courts to grant divorces prior to the adoption 
of unilateral divorce.  
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inflation rate worsens the terms of trade between spouses, which reduces the returns from 
marriage.  This is because spouses who specialize in home production may be forced to enter the 
labor market in order to achieve pre-inflation consumption levels, which lowers the returns from 
marriage in the traditional family model.  Regardless of whether one uses the traditional family 
model or one in which consumption complementarities define the returns from marriage, 
inflation reduces these returns, because it acts as a tax on the household.
6
   
 
 
3   Data 
This study uses time-series data from 1929 to 2006. Compared to cross-section or panel data 
studies (e.g., Becker et al. 1977; Weiss and Willis 1997; Charles and Stephens 2004), the much 
longer time horizon makes it possible to identify the uniqueness of the mid-1960s to mid-1970s 
period with its surge in the divorce rate. Using this long sample requires some solutions to 
apparent data problems, such as the unavailability of some variables back to 1929. This includes 
the FLFPR. We use female participation in higher education as a substitute for the FLFPR, 
because annual data on the FLFPR are only available from 1948-2006.  There are missing years 
of data even for female participation in higher education: only odd years are reported from 1929 
to 1945.  We replace the missing years of data with the average of the odd years.  For example, 
female participation in higher education in 1930 is taken to equal the average of the 1929 and 
1931 values.  Figure 2 illustrates that the FLFPR and female participation in higher education 
display very similar trends from 1948 to 2006.   
Our primary outcome variable is divorces per 1,000 persons.  We use this variable instead of 
divorces per 1,000 married couples because the Center for Disease Control (CDC) stopped 
                                               
6 It is possible for wage increases to offset rising prices.  However, it has been shown that prices respond more 
quickly than wages to positive money-supply shocks (Christiano et al. 2005), which suggests a decrease in the 
returns from marriage when the inflation rate rises.   
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collecting data on divorces per 1,000 married couples in 1997. By creating an update of the latter 
divorce measure from generally available data sources,
7
  we can show that the two divorce 
measures display similar behavior over the complete sample used in this study.  In fact, a 
scatterplot of divorces per 1,000 persons and divorces per 1,000 married couples reveals a clean, 
linear relationship between the two variables (Figure 7).  This suggests that the estimated effects 
of our explanatory variables would be similar regardless of which divorce measure is used.
8
     
Variables for access to oral contraception and unilateral divorce are constructed by dividing 
cumulated state populations that have adopted the law in a year by the total U.S. population in 
that year, which effectively form diffusion functions for each variable.  The complete diffusion 
of ―the pill‖ occurred in 1976, 16 years after the first legal change providing access to young, 
unmarried women.  We use Bailey’s (2006) coding for the oral contraceptive laws, and we use 
Friedberg’s (1998) and Gruber’s (2004) codings for unilateral divorce reform.  We also check 
the sensitivity of the effect on the divorce rate of unilateral divorce reform to alternative law 
codings, but the results are largely robust across different classification schemes.
9
    
To incorporate the effects of major wars on divorce rates, we construct variables that proxy 
for the intensity or ―stress‖ of the war.  We use casualties relative to deployments for this 
purpose, which allows us to create an objective measure of stress and/or the intensity of the war.  
More specifically, the variable that proxies for the ―stress‖ of the Vietnam War is defined as U.S. 
                                               
7 Multiplying the number of divorces per 1,000 persons by the U.S. population per 1,000 persons gives the total 
number of divorces.  Dividing this number by the stock of married couples creates the variable of interest: divorces 
per 1,000 married couples.  This measure draws on various U.S. Statistical Abstracts.  Data on divorces per 1,000 
married couples are available until 1995.  Therefore, to check our estimates for the years 1996-2006, we use the 
same calculation method described above for the available years and find that any difference in the estimates is in 
the decimal places.   
8 We also estimate all models with divorces per 1,000 married couples as the dependent variable. The estimates 
from these models are not materially different from the models that use divorces per 1,000 persons. See Appendix. 
9
 Historical accounts of divorce-law reform and reforms allowing access to oral contraceptives suggest that they 
are plausibly exogenous. See Jacob (1988) for details on divorce-law reform and Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey 
(2006) for a discussion of state-level reforms allowing young, unmarried women access to oral contraceptives.    
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military personnel deaths due to the Vietnam War as a fraction of U.S. military deployments in 
East Asia.  The data series for the Korean War and WWII are derived in analogy to those of the 
Vietnam War, except troop deployments for WWII are culled from Matloff (1990).
10
  
We also include three standard macroeconomic variables: the inflation rate, economic 
growth, and changes in the unemployment rate.  An interaction term between economic growth 
and an indicator variable for whether the economy is in a(n) recessionary or expansionary period 
allows economic growth to have asymmetric effects on the divorce rate in recessionary and 
expansionary periods. Including squared terms of some explanatory variables allows for 
nonlinear responses.  These variables are required in some models because Ramsey’s RESET 
tests reveal functional form misspecification in their absence.  
Table 1 provides variable names, definitions, and sources, while Table 2 presents summary 
statistics for 1929-2006, 1929-1948, and 1949-2006.  Because of the apparent structural break 
for some of the macroeconomic variables around 1948/49, we estimate models using different 
sample periods: 1949-2006 and 1929-2006.  Examining the summary statistics for periods 1929-
1948 and 1949-2006 indicate that there is far less volatility in the variables from 1949-2006.   
We test each of the variables used in our analysis for the presence of a unit root and 
stationarity (Table 3). This indicates that the variables divorce, fem_ratio, fem_ratio
2
 are I(1). 
The evidence is somewhat ambiguous for the Vietnam variable.  The variables WWII, Korea, and 
Vietnam are in one sense dummy variables because they have nonzero values only for a limited 
number of observations.  However, in another sense, the variables are different from dummy 
variables because their nonzero values are not equal to unity but are based on observed figures of 
casualties and the degree of military involvement by the U.S.  The variables pill, gruber, and 
friedberg are also nominally I(1).  However, they are not following random walks but are the 
                                               
10 See Appendix for sources and more detail on the construction of the war variables.   
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result of a stable diffusion process.  The variables inflation, ygrowth, ygrowth
2
, das*ygrowth, and 
Δunemp are I(0).   
 
4   Econometric Methodology 
To encompass earlier results provided in the literature, the study uses two basic types of 
approaches, single-equation estimators and system estimators.  Since the divorce rate and some 
other variables are non-stationary, some care is needed to avoid spurious results.  We employ a 
large number of statistical specification tests to rule out spurious results for single-equation 
estimates.  As an additional guard against spurious results, especially the omission of important 
variables, we check whether the single-equation models contain any stochastic or non-stochastic 
trend components that are not captured by the included right-hand-side variables. For that 
purpose, the study uses the unobserved component methodology (UCM) of Harvey (1989) as 
further elaborated by Durbin and Koopman (2001).  As this methodology is not in common use, 
it is briefly described in the next few paragraphs. 
Checking for unobserved stochastic or non-stochastic trends is a way to identify whether a 
nonstationary dependent variable, in our case the divorce rate, is driven by the presence of a 
trend in addition to the included regressor variables. If a trend can be identified by the UCM, one 
may surmise that important variables are omitted from the regression and that an OLS regression 
that ignores the trend generates potentially meaningless results. To allow for unobserved trend 
components, we specify the UCM in the form 
 , 1,2,.,t t ij i t j ti jy x for t T       ,  (1) 
where ty  is the dependent variable and t the time-varying unobserved component; ,i t jx   
represents explanatory variable i subject to time lag j; 
,i j  denotes the coefficient associated with 
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the variable; and t  is a zero mean, constant variance, irregular component.  The term t  
represents the unobserved stochastic trend component that differentiates equation (1) from an 
OLS regression equation.  It captures the impact of unobservables and omitted variables that 
influence the dependent variable.  By removing their influence from the error term, the irregular 
component is uncorrelated with the variables in xi,t-j.  This makes for unbiased coefficient 
estimates.  
The stochastic trend, μt, takes the form: 
  21 1 ~ 0,t t t t NID           (2) 
  21 ~ 0,t t t NID       . (3)                                             
The term t  is the ―level component‖ of the unobserved stochastic trend and t  its ―slope‖.  
Equation (2) is modeled as a random walk with drift and equation (3) as a pure random walk.  
The terms t  and t  are white noise disturbances that are assumed independent of each other and 
of t .  The terms 
2
  and 
2
  are the hyper-parameters that define the stochastic trend t , which 
need to be estimated.  Once they are known, the state vectors t  and t  can be retrieved from 
the model.
11
  To the extent that one or both of the hyper-parameters are zero, the unobserved 
stochastic trend simplifies.  In the limiting case, in which both hyper-parameters are zero, the 
stochastic trend model collapses to OLS, either with or without a deterministic trend, depending 
on whether the drift term 
t  is different from zero.  If 
2
  equals zero and 
2
  is nonzero, the 
model takes the smooth-trend specification, which is integrated of order two (Harvey 1997).   
                                               
11 See Harvey (1989) for a detailed description of structural time-series models.  The statistical package used—
Structural Time-Series Analyser, Modeller, and Predictor (STAMP)—offers a convenient estimation procedure (see 
Koopman et al. 2000).   
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As we shall see, single-equation regression models with ―traditional‖ right-hand-side 
variables cannot fully explain the U.S. divorce rate in the late-1960s and early-1970s.  This tends 
to give rise to a strong, stochastic-trend component for this time period, which is an indication of 
omitted variables. It appears that the new variables that we add to the set of standard explanatory 
variables of the divorce rate eliminate any sign of or need for a stochastic trend. OLS would 
therefore appear to generate meaningful results in the sense that no important variables are 
missing. 
However, single-equation methods, whether in the form of OLS or UCM, assume that the 
right-hand-side variables are at least weakly exogenous.  That may be a strong assumption in the 
present context with the divorce rate on the left side of the regression and female participation in 
higher education on the right. We, therefore, investigate the need for a systems estimator, one 
that allows both variables to be endogenous and nonstationary.  The empirical evidence indicates 
the need for a systems approach to cointegration as suggested by Johansen and Juselius (1990).  
As this methodology is well established and amply described in textbooks (e.g. Juselius 2006; 
Lütkepohl 2007), only a few brief comments are needed. In particular, the trace test is used to 
test for the cointegration rank. A constant is always included in the cointegration space. In 
addition to the two endogenous variables divorce and fem-ratio, a number of models also contain 
weakly exogenous variables in the cointegration space (pill, friedberg/gruber). Some models 
also contain dummy variables or variables, such as the war variables, that are treated in this 
manner in the vector error correction model (VECM). These variables never enter the 
cointegration space. Whenever dummy variables are added to the VECM, the critical values of 
the cointegration rank test are based on simulated values with 2,500 replications and random 
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walks of length 400.
12
  Bartlett’s small sample corrections (Johansen 2002) are employed for the 
cointegration tests whenever they are available. Cointegration rank tests are conducted on 
VECMs whose appropriate lag length is verified by a lag length reduction test, which starts with 
five lags for all models and examines whether fewer lags are supported by the data. 
 
 
5   Estimation Results 
5.1  Single-Equation Estimates 
Table 4 provides least-squares estimation results. The table is organized around four models.  
Model 1 uses a minimal number of regressors.  It indicates that the divorce rate is subject to a 
moderate degree of persistence.  The lagged dependent variable is less than 0.9, which deflects 
potential problems associated with unit-root processes.  However, Ramsey’s RESET test 
indicates that the functional form of the model is improperly specified.  Structural stability, as 
tested by Quandt’s likelihood-ratio test, is also rejected.  Hence, Model 1 cannot be accepted as a 
representation of the data generating process (DGP).  Adding non-linear terms to Model 1, as in 
Model 2, removes these specification problems.
13
  Additional terms, as added to Models 3 and 4, 
do not significantly improve the model fit, with the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and the 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) becoming worse. Only the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
improves.  Tests for correct functional form, homoskedasticity, normality, as well as the absence 
of ARCH effects and of structural change do not indicate any problems with Models 2, 3, and 4.  
While there is no problem with autocorrelation in Models 1, 2, and 3, some autocorrelation is 
present in Model 4.  
                                               
12 Details are discussed in the CATS in RATS manual (Dennis et al. 2005). 
13 All models are tested also for ARCH effects. This is somewhat uncommon for non-financial data. However, 
as recently suggested by Hamilton (2007), there is strong evidence that ignoring ARCH effects can induce spurious 
results in typical macroeconomic models. 
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The UCM estimation results of Table 5 provide additional evidence that Models 2, 3, and 4 
capture the DGP: no deterministic or stochastic trend remains; the estimated variances of the 
level and slope components are zero or very close to zero in the case of Model 3.  By contrast, 
the OLS specification of Model 1 does not fully capture the DGP.  This model contains a 
deterministic trend although not a stochastic trend when estimated as an UCM.  One may note 
that a strong, stochastic trend emerges for Model 1 if it is estimated without the variables pill and 
Vietnam. This trend is depicted in Figure 8 along with the original divorce series. The stochastic 
trend identifies a strong increase in the divorce rate from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s.  It is 
precisely this increase in the divorce rate that has not been explained so far in the literature.  As 
is apparent from Model 1 of Table 5, the inclusion of the nontraditional variables, pill and 
Vietnam, remove all traces of a stochastic trend although there remains a small deterministic 
trend and some functional form issues.  However, these problems are removed in Model 2 of 
Table 4 by the inclusion of second powers of fem_ratio, and ygrowth.  
The above discussion suggests two conclusions: first, the  nonstandard covariates pill and 
Vietnam play a key role in capturing the heretofore unexplained upward trend in the divorce rate 
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s; second, the fact that a relatively simple model, such as 
Model 2, shows neither a statistical specification problem in Table 4 nor any trace of an 
unobserved stochastic trend in Table 5 indicates, in fairly strong terms, that no essential 
explanatory variable is missing from the model.
14
  
Table 6 provides the implied long-run marginal effects and elasticities of the variables and 
models presented in Table 4. The long-run effects of fem_ratio, pill, and Vietnam are each 
statistically significant at the one-percent level.  The former has a negative effect, while the latter 
                                               
14 This would include variables that are used in some panel data studies of divorce rates, such as changes in 
welfare payments (e.g., Hoffman and Duncan 1995). 
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two variables have positive effects on the divorce rate. The long-run impact of inflation on the 
divorce rate is positive, as suggested by Nunley (2008), but it is only marginally significant. Its 
short-run impact, by contrast, is largely statistically significant.  
Model 4 of Table 4 includes a variable for the Korean War and a variable (das*ygrowth) 
that allows economic growth to have asymmetric effects on the divorce rate inside and outside of 
recessionary periods. The estimation results suggest that economic growth has a large, 
statistically significant, positive effect on the divorce rate in recessionary periods but none 
outside of recessions. This result may provide some impetus to reassess the impact of changes in 
the macroeconomy on divorce rates.  Previous work finds a positive relationship between 
economic growth and the divorce rate (e.g., see Nunley 2008), but does not distinguish between 
growth during recessionary and expansionary periods.   
Next, we extend the sample from 1949 back to 1929.  Table 7 shows least-squares estimates 
for the sample period 1929-2006.  Extending the sample in this way necessitates the inclusion of 
variables for WWII.
15
  In each of the models, there are some statistical specification problems. 
For this reason, we report p-values that are based on a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
robust covariance matrix (HAC).  The Quandt likelihood-ratio test indicates a structural break 
around 1949, which confirms the selection of 1949 as the starting point for the calculations 
shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6.  The structural change appears associated mainly with the 
coefficients of the macroeconomic variables.  For example, if one compares Tables 4 and 7, 
inflation is no longer statistically significant once the sample is extended back to 1929. Also, 
ygrowth has the opposite directional effect in the longer sample.   
                                               
15 Model 7 includes an observation specific dummy variable for the year 1947 (d47). 
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We also estimate UCM models for the time period 1929 to 2006.  Table 8 reveals that no 
unobserved stochastic or deterministic trend is present in any of the three models. As for Models 
2 to 4 of Table 5, this suggests that no important variables are omitted from the models.  
Because the AIC, SBC, and HQC improve as additional covariates enter the base model of 
Table 7, we select Model 7 as the preferred model specification of Table 7. The estimates of 
Model 7 are largely consistent with the results of Table 4 for the variables fem_ratio, pill, and 
Vietnam. The statistically significant effects of the WWII variables are not surprising given the 
large change in the divorce rate during those years (Figure 1). The variable for the Korea War, 
by contrast, has no statistically significant effect in Model 7. This is consistent with previous 
work (South 1985; Anderson and Little 1999) and Figure 1. The long-run marginal effects and 
elasticities implied by the estimates of Table 7 are presented in Table 9. The values for the 
variables fem_ratio, pill, and Vietnam are similar in terms of size and statistical significance to 
those of Table 6.  
The overall conclusion from the single-equation models is that increased access to the pill 
has a positive short- and long-run impact on the divorce rate across all models, while female 
participation in higher education has negative short- and long-run effects on the divorce rate.  
The finding of a negative relationship between divorce and fem_ratio is opposite to that of 
previous research, which typically identifies a positive relationship between divorce and the 
FLFPR, or its proxy, female participation in higher education.  For the short sample period 
extending from 1949 to 2006, we estimate that a 0.1 increase in fem_ratio decreases the number 
of divorces per capita by 2.12 in the long run.  For the longer sample from 1929 to 2006, the 
equivalent decrease is estimated to be 1.73 divorces per capita.  The persistent and positive effect 
found for increased access to the pill differs from the findings of Goldin and Katz (2002).  
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However, our results are consistent with those of Smith (1997).   According to our estimates, a 
0.1 increase in the percentage of the population affected by increased access to the pill leads to 
an increase in new divorces per capita by about 0.4 in the long run, regardless of which sample 
period is used.   
The econometric evidence strongly supports the idea that the Vietnam War served as a 
catalyst of major social changes, which also involved divorce rates. The long-run marginal effect 
of the Vietnam variable on the divorce rate is significant at conventional levels of statistical 
significance across all models.  Inflation is only statistically significant in the models using data 
from 1949 to 2006. The effects of economic growth on divorce are also different in the two 
sample periods, with positive short- and long-run effects for the shorter sample.  For the longer 
sample, economic growth is statistically significant only during recessions and it has a negative 
impact on the divorce rate during those times. 
 
5.2   Systems Estimation 
In the remaining analysis, we consider the possibility that divorce and female participation 
in higher education are jointly determined or endogenous.  Our analysis thus far has used 
variations of the autoregressive-distributed lag (ADL) model, which requires that all right-hand-
side variables be at least weakly exogenous.  Few researchers account for the endogeneity of 
female participation in higher education or in the labor force. Bremmer and Kesselring (2004) is 
an exception. They treat the divorce rate and the FLFPR as jointly endogenous variables in their 
empirical work, but do not identify a statistically significant long-run relationship between the 
divorce rate and the FLFPR. 
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Table 10 presents the cointegrating vectors and the underlying tests for cointegration based 
on the Johansen/Juselius vector error correction (VECM) approach. It is noteworthy that the 
cointegration rank tests suggest exactly one cointegrating vector regardless of variations in the 
model specification.  Model 4 is chosen as the preferred model because it has fewer statistical 
problems than the other models.  The Ljung-Box Q-statistic rejects the null of no higher-order 
autocorrelation in Models 2, 3, 5, and 6, but is not statistically significant in Model 4.  In 
addition to the two endogenous variables, divorce and fem_ratio, we include the exogenous 
variable, pill, in the cointegration space of Models 1 to 4 and one of two alternative measures for 
the diffusion of unilateral divorce laws in Models 5 and 6.  
Models 2 to 6 of Table 10 add several unrestricted exogenous variables to the VECM, in 
particular the war variables WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and two observation-specific dummy 
variables, d41 and d47.  These variables do not have a large impact on the resulting cointegrating 
vector. More importantly, their presence or absence does not affect that exactly one cointegrating 
vector results for the two endogenous variables divorce, fem_ratio, and the exogenous variable, 
pill.
16
   
The coefficients of the cointegrating vectors (CIVs) of Models 1 through 4 of Table 10 
largely match the long-run marginal effects estimated for the single-equation models of Tables 6 
and 9. For example, the long-run marginal effect of fem_ratio is -21.20 for Model 2 of Table 6 
and -16.01 for Model 6 of Table 9, while the long-run CIV estimate for fem_ratio is -22.71 for 
Model 4 of Table 10.
17
  The long-run effects for pill in Table 6 and 9 are 4.43 and 3.80, 
respectively, while the long-run effect is 6.59 in the CIV from Table 10.   
                                               
16Adding any of these terms changes the statistical distribution of the cointegration tests. Bootstrap simulations 
are conducted to approximate the correct statistical significance level for the cointegration test in each case. 
17 The cointegration results as reported in Table 10 are not materially different if the sample is limited to the 
time period 1949 to 2006.  This applies both to the cointegration tests and the estimated elements of the 
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Models 5 and 6 consider the long-run relationship between the divorce rate and the diffusion 
of unilateral divorce laws. Signs and statistical significance and fit are very similar between the 
two models and between Models 5 and 6 and Model 4. In fact, based on statistical grounds, there 
is little reason to prefer one over the other two models. The similarity of the variables for oral 
contraception and unilateral divorce law diffusion also do not allow selecting a preferred variable 
by including both variables simultaneously in a model. It is, therefore, necessary to rely on other 
work, such as the findings of Smith (1997) and Wolfers (2006), to decide which of the two, oral 
conceptives or divorce law changes, had more of an impact on the divorce rate during the 1960s 
and 1970s.    
Although not reported in Table 10, the VECM equations have adjustment parameters in 
front of the error correction terms that are different from zero at any reasonable level of 
statistical significance.  This confirms that neither the variable fem_ratio nor the variable divorce 
is weakly exogenous.  As a consequence, we expect the OLS regressions to underestimate the 
impact of the variables fem_ratio and pill on the divorce rate.  This is borne out by the estimates: 
the cointegrating vectors of Table 10 all imply a larger long-run coefficient values for the 
variables fem_ratio and pill  than the marginal effects presented in Table 9. 
 
5.3   Plausibility of Estimation Results 
To assess the plausibility of the estimation results presented so far, it is helpful to first revisit 
Figures 3 to 5. The figures relate to the relationship over time of the divorce rate and the 
participation of females in higher education, but they are materially the same as those for the 
                                                                                                                                                       
cointegrating vector and their statistical significance. For example, the CIV corresponding to Model 1 of Table 12 
for the time period 1949 to 2006 is given as (1.000, 23.316,   -6.671, -11.426) and the p-values for the cointegration 
tests are 0.000 and 0.207, respectively. 
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divorce rate and the more common variable FLFPR. Hence, the discussion has more general 
implications.  
The linear regression line of Figure 3 has a positive slope. This is not consistent with any of 
the long-run marginal effects estimated for the variable fem_ratio in Tables 6, 9, or 10. As 
mentioned before, the positive slope hides two distinct negative relationships between the 
divorce rate and the variable fem_ratio, one at the lower left end of Figure 3 and the other at the 
upper right end of Figure 3. The two negative relationships are shown separately in Figures 4 and 
5. The regression coefficients on fem_ratio in Figures 4 and 5 (-19.1 and -11.2, respectively) are 
very close to and, hence, fully consistent with the long-run marginal effects of the single-
equation models reported in Table 6 (in particular preferred Model 2), Table 9 (in particular 
preferred Model 7), and the cointegration relationships of Table 10 (in particular preferred Model 
4).   
The plausibility of the estimation results for the variable pill can best be assessed by 
revisiting Figure 6. The regression line superimposed on the scatterplot of Figure 6 reveals a 
positive regression coefficient for variable pill (2.27). This coefficient is fully consistent in sign 
and in order of magnitude with the long-run marginal effects estimates of variable pill reported 
in Tables 6, 9, and 10.  The estimates presented on the highly significant and positive effect of 
the Vietnam War variable on the divorce also appear to be well reflected in Figure 6, if one 
allows for a one-year lag to allow the stress of war to affect the divorce rate. Allowing for the 
one-year lag, the values of the divorce rate in Figure 6 tend to move above the regression line 
when the Vietnam War variable reaches its highest values (1966 to 1970). One may note, that the 
higher than predicted values of the divorce rate for 1970 and 1971 may also be related, as 
suggested by Wolfers (2006) to the positive impact of the change in the divorce laws, which 
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affected a large number of states in 1970s. The results of Table 10 would certainly be consistent 
with this explanation. 
We find that diffusion of the pill and unilateral divorce laws have qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar effects on the divorce rate.  Based on statistical fit, we are unable to 
disentangle which of these factors is driving the rise in divorce during the 1960s and 1970s from 
the time-series data for the U.S. From the above discussion, it would appear reasonable to 
assume that access to oral contraception had the major impact on the divorce rate, with some 
supporting effect of the divorce law changes starting in 1970. Such an interpretation would be 
largely consistent with recent results presented in the literature.  For example, Wolfers (2006), 
using state-level panel data for the U.S., concludes that the adoption of unilateral divorce laws 
led to a small, transitory rise in U.S. divorce rates.
18
  The careful econometric evidence collected 
by Smith (1997) of the impact of the pill on divorce rates in England and Wales also supports the 
conclusion that the pill is more likely the key factor for the rise in divorce rates in the 1960s and 
early-1970s than changes in divorce laws. Similar to Wolfers (2006) for the U.S., Smith (1997) 
concludes that reforms allowing easier access to divorce led only to a temporary rise in divorce 
rates, with no evidence of a long-run relationship. Finally, visual inspection of time plots of the 
divorce rates of most European countries (Gonzalez and Viitanen 2006, Figure 2) indicate a 
distinct rise in divorce rates in almost all countries prior to the implementation of either no-fault 




                                               
18 Others find similar results (e.g., Friedberg 1998), but they do not estimate the full adjustment process as in 
Wolfers (2006).   
19 The manuscript can be accessed at ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp2023.pdf.  
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6   Summary and Conclusions 
This study examines the evolution of the U.S. divorce rate from 1929 to 2006, with the 
primary aim of explaining the puzzling rise in the divorce rate during the mid-1960s to the mid-
1970s.  We extend previous research in a number of ways.  First, following Smith (1997), we 
consider whether access to oral contraception contributed to the rise in the divorce rate and how 
this compares in its impact on divorces of changes in divorce laws in the 1970s. Second, we 
extend the analysis of the determinants of divorce rates back to 1929 to allow for more variation 
in the sample observations. Third and finally, we construct objective measures for the effects of 
WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War on the divorce rate; this contrasts with all previous 
research which has used observation-specific indicator variables to capture the effects of wars on 
divorce rates.  
We show that previous work that has been too narrowly focused on the 1960s and 1970s 
necessarily identifies a positive relationship between the female labor-force participation rate or 
its close proxy, female participation in higher education, and the divorce rate. By limiting the 
analysis to a sample that is overweighted by observations from the 1960s and 1970s, it is easy to 
miss that there is a very distinct negative relationship between the divorce rate and female 
participation in the labor force and higher education: this holds in general except for the ten-year 
time horizon from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s.  
The sharp rise in the divorce rate over that time period is the outcome of a number of 
transitional influences that permanently shifted the U.S. divorce rate to a higher level. The 
influences that are responsible for this marked shift in the level of the divorce rate are, in our 
assessment, mainly associated with increased access to oral contraception. The ramifications of 
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the Vietnam War and divorce-law reforms also played a role, although it appears that their 
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Table 1: Variable Names, Definitions, and Sources 
Name Definition Source 
divorce Number of divorces per 1,000 persons Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Millennium Edition and 
various U.S. Statistical Abstracts. 
WWII U.S. military personnel deaths due to 
WWII as a fraction of U.S. military 
deployments for WWII. 
See Appendix 
Korea U.S. military personnel deaths as a fraction 
of U.S. military deployments in East Asia.   
See Appendix 
Vietnam U.S. military personnel deaths due to the 
Vietnam War as a fraction of U.S. military 
deployments in East Asia.   
See Appendix 
pill Diffusion function, measured as the 
percentage of the U.S. population affected 
by increased access to oral contraceptives.   
Law coding is from Bailey (2006); 
population data are from the 
Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Millennium Edition and U.S. 
Statistical Abstracts.  
friedberg/ 
gruber 
Diffusion function, measured as the 
percentage of the U.S. population affected 
by unilateral divorce law reform.   
Law codings are from (1998) and 
Gruber (2004); population data by 
state and for the U.S. are from the 
Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Millennium Edition and U.S. 
Statistical Abstracts. 
inflation Log of the ratio of the Consumer Price 





ygrowth  Log of the ratio of U.S. Gross National 
Product (GNP) at period t relative to U.S. 
GNP at t-1. 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/s
eries/GNPCA?cid=106    
das*ygrowth Log of the ratio of U.S. Gross National 
Product (GNP) at period t relative to U.S. 
GNP at t-1 multiplied by a dummy variable 
that equals one when the economy is in a 
recessionary period and zero otherwise.   
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/s
eries/GNPCA?cid=106     
fem_ratio 
  
Percentage of women enrolled in higher 
education relative to the total population 
enrolled in higher education 
Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Millennium Edition and 
various U.S. Statistical Abstracts. 
Δunemp Annual change in the unemployment rate, 
measured as the percentage of the 
population who is unemployed but actively 
pursuing employment. 
1929 to 1941: U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Colonial Times to 
1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960), 
p.70; 1942 to 1947: BLS statistics at 
www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf; for 
1948 to 2006: FRED St. Louis, 
monthly data averaged. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Med. Min.     Max. St. Dev. C.V. Skew.    Kurt. 
                  
1929-2006         
divorce 3.36 3.45 1.30 5.30 1.22 0.36 0.04 -1.44 
fem_ratio 0.45 0.43 0.29 0.58 0.08 0.18 -0.04 -1.19 
pill 0.46 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.48 1.05 0.18 -1.93 
inflation 3.30 2.95 -10.30 14.65 4.06 1.23 -0.13 2.34 
ygrowth 3.47 3.60 -13.05 18.43 5.08 1.46 -0.13 2.58 
das*ygrowth -0.66 0.00 -13.05 0.00 2.26 3.44 -4.18 17.11 
Δ unemp 0.02 -0.25 -4.96 7.71 2.08 109.1 1.16 3.64 
WWII 0.14 0.00 0.00 2.80 0.50 3.62 3.66 12.81 
Korea 0.17 0.00 0.00 9.48 1.10 6.49 7.96 64.12 
Vietnam 0.12 0.00 0.00 2.16 0.40 3.18 3.59 12.46 
                  
1929-1948         
divorce 2.22 1.90 1.30 4.30 0.81 0.36 1.09 0.40 
fem_ratio 0.41 0.42 0.29 0.50 0.05 0.13 -1.05 0.84 
inflation 1.90 1.96 -10.30 14.65 6.17 3.24 -0.05 -0.10 
ygrowth 3.66 4.85 -13.05 18.43 9.37 2.56 -0.13 -0.99 
das*ygrowth -2.29 0.00 -13.05 0.00 4.08 1.78 -1.64 1.23 
Δ unemp 0.03 -0.70 -4.96 7.71 3.84 119.5 0.73 -0.56 
WWII 0.54 0.00 0.00 2.80 0.89 1.65 1.23 0.11 
                  
1949-2006         
divorce 3.75 4.00 2.10 5.30 1.09 0.29 -0.22 -1.51 
fem_ratio 0.47 0.49 0.30 0.58 0.09 0.19 -0.26 -1.46 
pill 0.62 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.75 -0.46 -1.73 
inflation 3.78 3.02 -0.95 13.58 2.94 0.78 1.36 1.77 
ygrowth 3.41 3.51 -1.87 8.74 2.37 0.69 -0.15 -0.29 
das*ygrowth -0.09 0.00 -1.87 0.00 0.30 3.25 -4.25 19.73 
Δ unemp 0.01 -0.25 -2.09 2.83 1.06 71.35 0.92 0.73 
Korea 0.23 0.00 0.00 9.48 1.28 5.59 6.81 46.48 
Vietnam 0.17 0.00 0.00 2.16 0.45 2.70 2.98 8.13 
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Table 3: Unit Root and Stationarity Tests 
(1929-2007 or  maximum available) 
   
 ADF – H0: I (1) 
 











      
Continuous Variables:      
divorce 0.445 0.852 1 1.441 2.797 
fem_ratio 0.943 0.576 4 0.283 1.245 
fem_ratio
2
 0.941 0.542 3 1.586 1.586 
pill 0.790 0.563 1 1.785 2.500 
friedberg 0.860 0.573 4 0.204 1.427 
gruber 0.871 0.592 4 0.261 1.455 
mechoulan 0.869 0.622 5 0.193 1.226 
inflation 0.001 0.018 2 0.369 0.353 
ygrowth 0.000 0.000 3 0.063 0.063 
ygrowth
2
 0.088 0.000 3/2 0.843 0.843 
das*ygrowth 0.000 0.000 0 0.624 1.141 
Δ unemp 0.000 0.000 3 0.064 0.064 
      
Quasi Dummy Variables:      
WWII 0.005 0.010 2 0.329 0.401 
WWII
2 
0.006 0.015 2 0.301 0.358 
Korea 0.000 0.000 0 0.167 0.240 
Vietnam 0.001 0.007 1 0.281 0.281 
      
Notes:  ADF stands for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test; the statistics for the ADF test are p-values.  The 
ADF tests whether the variables follow a unit-root process, with unit root as the null hypothesis.  The null 
hypothesis for the KPSS test is stationarity.  The critical values for the KPSS test are 0.347 (10%), 0.463 
(5%), 0.574 (2.5%), and 0.739 (1%).  The column denoting lag order represents the number of lags used for 
both the ADF and KPSS tests.   
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Table 4: OLS Estimates, 1949-2006 














         
constant 0.8753 0.000 -0.7652 0.236 -0.7529 0.237 -0.8318 0.233 
divorce (-1) 0.8761 0.000 0.8705 0.000 0.8732 0.000 0.8881 0.000 
fem_ratio -1.9070 0.000 5.8625 0.045 5.3304 0.066 5.8634 0.072 
fem_ratio
2
   -8.6085 0.006 -7.8314 0.011 -8.3935 0.016 
pill 0.5912 0.000 0.5738 0.000 0.5453 0.000 0.5238 0.000 
inflation 0.0143 0.019 0.0101 0.073 0.0125 0.032 0.0091 0.122 
ygrowth 0.0112 0.042 0.0343 0.011 0.0562 0.005 0.0145 0.566 
ygrowth
2
   -0.0040 0.035 -0.0049 0.014 0.0002 0.938 
das*ygrowth       0.1624 0.018 
d_unemp     0.0393 0.130 0.0443 0.086 
Vietnam (-1) 0.1850 0.000 0.1319 0.000 0.1284 0.000 0.1247 0.000 
Korea       -0.0120 0.334 








  0.9928  0.9945  0.9946  0.9950  
Log-
likelihood    59.408  68.305  69.704  73.351 
 
AIC    -104.815  -118.610  -119.408  -122.702  
SBC  -90.392  -100.066  -98.804  -97.977  
HQC  -99.197  -111.386  -111.382  -113.071  
         
RESET 0.001  0.179  0.149  0.236 
Homoskedasticity 0.098  0.530  0.303  0.240 
Normality 0.951  0.551  0.293  0.363 
Autocorrelation LM(1) 0.831  0.277  0.241  0.050 
Autocorrelation LM(2) 0.798  0.378  0.213  0.033 
Autocorrelation LM(3) 0.849  0.344  0.313  0.077 
ARCH (1)  0.312  0.161  0.260  0.484 
ARCH (2)  0.462  0.290  0.525  0.655 
ARCH (3)  0.756  0.456  0.710  0.774 
Quandt LR (max) <0.01  >0.10  >0.10  >0.10 
Harvey-Collier (cusum) 0.019  0.706  0.492  0.623 
         
Notes: (-1) denotes a lag order of one.  AIC stands for the Akaike Information Criterion, SBC for the 
Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion, HQC for the Hannan-Quinn Criterion; RESET is Ramsey’s test for correct 
functional form; Homoskedasticity is White’s test; Normality is a test for normality of the residuals; the null 
of no autocorrelation at various lag lenths is tested with the Breusch-Godfrey test; ARCH tests the null of no 
relationship between the current error variance and its past values; Quandt LR tests for the lack of structural 
breaks (Stock and Watson 2003); and Harvey-Collier tests parameter stability using cumulated recursive 
residuals.   
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Table 5: Models from Table 4 Estimated as Unobserved Component Models 



















  0.0068 1.0000 0.0065 1.0000 0.0064 1.0000 0.0059 1.0000 
2
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0116 0.0000 0.0005 
2
  0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
         
    coeff.      p-value coeff. p-value coeff.  p-value coeff. p-value 
  -0.745 0.323 -0,846 0.295 -0.932 0.243 -1.256 0.133 
  -0.017 0. 028 -0.001 0.865 -0.003 0.705 -0.008 0.351 
         
Notes: Only parameters that relate to stochastic or deterministic trends are provided, not the coefficients of the fixed 
regressors. The first three lines report the estimated variances for the level and slope components when they are 
allowed to be stochastic. The Q Ratio is the ratio of the estimated variances relative to the variance of the irregular 
component. Zero variances and Q values imply the lack of a stochastic trend. The last two lines present the coefficient 
estimates for the level and slope parameters when they are restricted to be fixed (non-stochastic);  equals the 
regression constant in this case and β the coefficient of a deterministic trend. The p-values for the slope coefficients in 
Models 2, 3, and 4 suggest the absence of a deterministic trend. The results imply that these models fully capture the 
trend in the divorce rate.   
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Table 6: Implied Long-Run Marginal Effects and Elasticities For Table 4 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
         
Long-Run Implied Marginal Effects:      
fem_ratio -15.390 0.004 -21.201 0.000 -19.725 0.001 -22.600 0.002 
pill 4.7714 0.000 4.4299 0.000 4.3010 0.000 4.6794 0.000 
inflation 0.1151 0.028 0.0782 0.080 0.0987 0.044 0.0809 0.133 
ygrowth (if positive) 0.0905 0.090 0.2335 0.044 0.4044 0.035 0.1319 0.528 
ygrowth (if negative) 0.0905 0.090 0.2335 0.053 0.4044 0.035 1.5825 0.036 
Vietnam 1.4933 0.006 1.0185 0.007 1.0124 0.008 1.1140 0.013 
Δ unemp     0.3097 0.168 0.3953 0.141 
Korea       -0.1069 0.378 
         
Long-Run Implied Elasticities:      
fem_ratio -0.2365 -0.3442 -0.3135 -0.3171  
pill 0.0976 0.0947 0.0900 0.0865  
inflation 0.1435 0.0102 0.0126 0.0091  
ygrowth (if positive) 0.0102 0.0275 0.0466 0.0135  
ygrowth (if negative) 0.0102 0.0275 0.0466 0.1611  
Vietnam 0.0083 0.0059 0.0057 0.0056  
Δ unemp     0.0002 0.0002  
Korea       -0.0007  
      
Notes: The long-run marginal effects are calculated using the nlcom command in STATA.     
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Table 7: Least Squares Estimates, 1929-2006, HAC Covariance Matrix 
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
 coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
       constant -2.1962 0.000 -2.0716 0.000 -1.7562 0.000 
divorce (-1) 0.7953 0.000 0.7778 0.000 0.8259 0.000 
fem_ratio 14.0684 0.000 12.8679 0.000 10.8408 0.000 
fem_ratio
2
 -18.0201 0.000 -16.4577 0.000 -13.8258 0.000 
pill 0.8432 0.001 0.8460 0.001 0.6390 0.000 
inflation -0.0038 0.626 0.0040 0.648 0.0093 0.199 
ygrowth -0.0169 0.141 0.0275 0.086 0.0177 0.298 
ygrowth
2
 -0.0013 0.002 -0.0037 0.000 -0.0031 0.001 
das*ygrowth   -0.0770 0.021 -0.0668 0.021 
Δ unemp -0.0517 0.019 -0.0298 0.039 -0.0364 0.035 
WWII 0.9095 0.000 1.0661 0.000 0.8877 0.000 
WWII
2
 -0.2539 0.000 -0.3152 0.000 -0.2568 0.000 
Vietnam (-1) 0.1368 0.000 0.1394 0.000 0.1289 0.000 
Korea 0.0232 0.002 0.0171 0.014 0.0112 0.162 
d47     -0.5498 0.000 
       
Unadjusted R
2
  0.9911  0.9922  0.9937  
Adjusted R
2
  0.9894  0.9906  0.9923  
Log-likelihood    57.994  62.935  71.461  
AIC -89.988  -97.871  -112.921  
SBC -59.518  -65.057  -77.764  
HQC -77.800  -84.746  -98.859  
       RESET  0.535  0.437  0.177 
Homoskedasticity  0.000  0.000  0.004 
Normality  0.009  0.162  0.025 
Autocorrelation LM(1)  0.048  0.095  0.018 
Autocorrelation LM(2)  0.076  0.112  0.065 
Autocorrelation LM(3)  0.030  0.018  0.017 
ARCH (1)  0.001  0.002  0.233 
ARCH (2)  0.004  0.004  0.383 
ARCH (3)  0.012  0.009  0.599 
Quandt LR (max)  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01 
Harvey-Collier (CUSUM)  0.663  0.315  0.481 
       Notes: (-1) denotes a lag order of one.  AIC stands for the Akaike Information Criterion, SBC for the Schwarz-
Bayesian Criterion, HQC for the Hannan-Quinn Criterion; RESET is Ramsey’s test for correct functional form; 
Homoskedasticity is White’s test; Normality is a test for normality of the residuals; the null of no 
autocorrelation at various lag lengths is tested with the Breusch-Godfrey test; ARCH tests the null of no 
relationship between the current error variance and its past values; Quandt LR tests for the lack of structural 
breaks (Stock and Watson 2003); and Harvey-Collier tests parameter stability using cumulated recursive 
residuals.    
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Table 8: Models from Table 7 Estimated as Unobserved Component Models 














       
2
  0.0152 1.0000 0.0123 1.0000 0.0115 1.0000 
2
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2
  0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 
       
 coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
  -2.472 0.001 -2.409 0.001 -1.902 0.003 
  0.002 0.400 0.002 0.267 0.001 0.624 
       
Notes: Only parameters that relate to stochastic or deterministic trends are provided, not the coefficients of 
the fixed regressors. The first three lines  report the estimated variances for the level and slope components 
when they are allowed to be stochastic. The Q Ratio is the ratio of the estimated variances relative to the 
variance of the irregular component. Zero variances and Q values imply the lack of a stochastic trend. The 
last two lines present the coefficient estimates for the level and slope parameters when they are restricted to 
be fixed (non-stochastic);  equals the regression constant in this case and β the coefficient of a 
deterministic trend. The p-values for the slope coefficients suggest the absence of a deterministic trend. The 
results imply  that the models fully capture the trend in the divorce rate.  
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Table 9: Implied Long-Run Marginal Effects and Elasticities For Table 7 
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
  coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
            
Long-Run Implied Marginal Effects:     
fem_ratio -19.303 0.000 -16.152 0.000 -17.146 0.000 
pill 4.1189 0.000 3.8064 0.000 3.6702 0.000 
inflation -0.0184 0.577 0.0181 0.618 0.0531 0.203 
ygrowth (if negative) -0.0885 0.226 -0.2396 0.024 -0.2998 0.010 
ygrowth (if positive) -0.0885 0.226 0.1071 0.167 0.0892 0.380 
Vietnam 0.6683 0.002 0.6270 0.003 0.7405 0.005 
Korea 0.1134 0.014 0.0771 0.112 0.0642 0.385 
WWII 3.2025 0.000 3.3786 0.000 3.6241 0.000 
Δ unemp -0.2524 0.070 -0.1343 0.173 -0.2090 0.059 
                     Long-Run Implied Elasticities:      
fem_ratio -2.5852  -2.1632  -2.2963  
pill 0.5639  0.5211  0.5025  
inflation -0.0181  0.0178  0.0522  
ygrowth (if negative) -0.0914  -0.2474  -0.3096  
ygrowth (if positive) -0.0914  0.1106  0.0921  
Vietnam 0.0239  0.0224  0.0264  
Korea 0.0057  0.0039  0.0032  
WWII 0.1334  0.1408  0.1510  
Δ unemp -0.0015  -0.0008  -0.0012  
       
         Notes: The long-run marginal effects are calculated using the nlcom command in STATA.     
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Table 10: Cointegration and VECM Results, 1929 to 2006 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Implicit CIV Normalized on Divorce     
constant -11.450 -11.333 -11.263 -10.685 -14.627 -14.172 
 (-10.01) (-9.97) (-9.49) (-13.22) (-9.96) (-11.03) 
fem_ratio 24.839 24.908 24.0230 22.710 33.865 33.167 
 (8.232) (8.02) (7.64) (10.68) (8.68) (9.49)) 
pill -7.156 -6.673 -6.7230 -6.589   
 (-13.21) (-12.50) (-12.14) (-17.58)   
gruber     -15.847  
     (-12.93)  
friedberg      -15.857 
      (-14.11) 
Unrestricted   WWII WWII WWII WWII WWII 









  Korea Vietnam Vietnam  Vietnam Vietnam  
   Korea Korea Korea Korea 
    d41 d41 d41 
    d46 d46 d46 
Cointegration Trace Test      
p-values:       
  null of rank = 0  0.000 0.006 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  null of rank = 1  0.206 0.347 0.387 0.249 0.318 0.345 
       
Statistics and Specification Tests of VECM     
Restricted  
Log-likelihood 477.164 489.628 504.619 577.257 576.638 576.908 
SBC -11.190 -11.240 -11.533 -13.288 -13.271 -13.278 
HQC -11.832 -11.938 -12.269 -14.100 -14.083 -14.090 
R
2
 divorce equation 0.690 0.685 0.723 0.821 0.858 0.854 
R
2
 second equation 0.621 0.676 0.706 0.956 0.943 0.945 
P-values of system tests      
  ARCH (1) 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.084 0.047 0.062 
  ARCH (2) 0.000 0.000 0.209 0.241 0.381 0.410 
  Ljung Box Q (18) 0.133 0.030 0.011 0.071 0.000 0.005 
  Autocorrelation (1)  0.134 0.015 0.358 0.001 0.026 0.015 
  Autocorrelation (2) 0.693 0.857 0.003 0.836 0.285 0.397 
  Normality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.166 0.065 0.225 
 
Note: T-values are in parenthesis. 5 lags are used.  The p-values of the cointegration rank test are based on 
simulated values with 2,500 replications and random walks of length 400.  The effective sample is 1934 to 
2006.  Calculations are done in CATS in RATS, version 2 (Dennis et al. 2005). 
 
  




Figure 1—Time Plots of Divorces per 1,000 Persons  


































































Divorce per 1,000 persons (left)
Divorce per 1,000 Married Couples (right)
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Figure 2—Female Participation in Higher Education  





























Female Participation of Higher Education
FLFPR
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Figure 3—Scatterplot of the Divorce Rate  
and Female Participation in Higher Education 
































































































Y = -1.10 + 9.89X
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Figure 4—Scatterplot of the Divorce Rate 
and Female  Participation in Higher Education  




























Female Participation in Higher Education
Y = 14.9 - 19.1X
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Figure 5—Scatterplot of the Divorce Rate  
and Female Participation in Higher Education  






























Female Participation in Higher Education
Y = 6.52 - 11.5X
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Figure 6—Scatterplot of the Divorce Rate and the 
Percentage of the Population with Access to Oral Contraceptives (pill) 









































Y = 2.31 + 2.27X
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Figure 7— Scatterplot of Divorces per 1,000 Persons and  































Divorces per 1,000 Married Couples
Y = 0.0941 + 0.223X
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Figure 8—Comparison of Actual Divorce Rate with the Remaining  














Divorce Rate Remaining Trend Component 
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
APPENDIX FOR REVIEW PURPOSES 
 
 
A.1  Sources and Construction of the War Variables 
Each of the war variables are constructed as casualties relative to deployments. For the Vietnam 
variable, deaths include not only combat casualties but also deaths due to accidents and death 
from wounds suffered in Vietnam but occurring elsewhere.  The overall death figures are highly 
correlated with the combat death figures and the large number of wounded: all three are driven 
by combat intensity.  The death counts in the numerator of the Vietnam War variable relate to 
deaths associated with the Vietnam War.  The denominator of the variable measures U.S. troop 
deployment in all of East Asia, not just Vietnam.  This is to account for the fact that many 
soldiers killed in Vietnam operated from bases in East Asia outside of Vietnam.  For all practical 
purposes, any deployment for a soldier to East Asia during the Vietnam War could mean to get 
into harm’s way in Vietnam.   
The Vietnam War death count comes from http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-
war/casualty-statistics.html#year: CACCF Record Counts by Year of Death or Declaration of 
Death (as of 12/98). The Vietnam War variable is constructed only for the years 1963 to 
1975, although deaths are recorded prior to and past that time period.  For the Korean War, 
casualties by year are derived from ―State-level Lists of Casualties from the Korean War (1951-
1957),‖ The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.20  For 
WWII, Navy casualties by year are calculated from data provided in ―U.S. Navy Personnel in 
World War II: Service and Casualty Statistics,‖ as taken from ―Annual Report, Navy and Marine 
                                               
20 http://www.archives.gov/research/korean-war/casualty-lists.  
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Corps Military Personnel Statistics, 30 June 1964,‖ Bureau of Naval Personnel and U.S. Marine 
Corps Headquarters, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.
21
  
Army casualties by year are taken from page 99 of ―Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle 
Deaths in World War II: Final Report.‖ Office of the Comptroller of the Army, Program Review 
& Analysis Division, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC, 20310, 1946.
22
   
Annual figures on U.S. troop deployments by region and country from 1950 onwards are 
taken from the March 1, 2006, ―U.S. Troop Deployment Dataset‖ as compiled by Tim Kane of 
the Heritage Foundation, Center for Data Analysis, Washington, D.C.
23
  Troop deployments in 
East Asia are used for the Korean War.  The source of the deployment figures is the same as that 
used for the Vietnam War.
24
 Troop deployments for WWII are culled from Matloff (1990).  
However, the deployment figures for 1946 that are related to WWII are assumed to be one sixth 
of all troops stationed overseas during that year. 
 
 
A.2  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this section, we check the sensitivity of some of the key estimation results to a number of 
alternative specifications.  First, we examine whether the results are materially affected by 
having employed the variable female participation in higher education (fem_ratio) in lieu of the 
variable female participation in the labor force (FLFPR). The single-equation estimates 
analogous to those of Table 4 but with FLFPR substituting for female participation in higher 
education are presented in Table A1. The coefficient estimates for the female labor-force 
participation rate (flfpr) are similar to those of the variable female participation in higher 
                                               
21 http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/ww2_statistics.htm. 
22 http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA438106.  
23 http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda06-02.cfm.  
24 http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/sp1943-44/index.htm (chapter 17, Tables 4 and 5 and Appendix E). 
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education as reported in Table 4.  The coefficients of the other covariates in Table A1 are also 
quantitatively similar to those of Table 4.  Hence, no bias is apparent by relying on female 
participation in higher education as a proxy for female labor-force participation. This confirms 
Figure 10, which identifies a very strong and close relationship between the two variables. 
Next, we check whether the chosen definition of the dependent variable, divorces per 1,000 
persons, leads to materially different results than the alternative divorce variable, divorces per 
1,000 married couples. For that purpose we re-estimate the models presented in Tables 4 and 7 
with divorces per 1,000 married couples as the dependent variable.  These estimates are shown in 
Tables A2 and A3.  While the estimated coefficients are larger than those reported in Tables 4 
and 7 for the alternative measure of the divorce rate, the directional effects and statistical 
significance are very similar to those that result for the dependent variable ―divorces per 1,000 
persons‖.  The substantially larger coefficient estimates in Tables A2 and A3 simply result from 
the fact that divorces per 1,000 married couples exceed divorces per 1,000 persons by a 
substantial margin.  Table A4 presents the resulting cointegrating equations when divorces per 
1,000 married couples is used as the dependent variable.  Similar to the results of Table 10, we 
find only one cointegrating vector, with the same directional relationship and statistical 
significance for the variables fem_ratio and pill.     
Lastly, we revisit Bremmer and Kesselring’s (2004) study by considering the potential 
cointegrating relationship between the divorce rate and the FLFPR for the years 1960-2001.  We 
find strong evidence for the presence of two cointegrating vectors. The two cointegrating 
equations both normalized on the divorce rate per 1,000 married couples are given as 
 23.460 0.097*divorce flfpr    (4) 
 115.776 2.037* .divorce flfpr   (5) 
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According to equation 4, the FLFPR and the divorce rate have a very small but positive 
relationship over time. This is similar to the findings of Bremmer and Kesselring (2004).  
Equation 5, by contrast, suggests the existence of an order of magnitude larger negative 
relationship between the divorce rate and the FLFPR, which is consistent with the results of both 
Tables 6, 9, and 10.    
In sum, the sensitivity analyses support the results shown in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.  The 
estimates reported in those sections are not materially affected by the chosen measure of the 
divorce rate. Likewise, when using the FLFPR instead of female participation in higher 
education, there is little difference in the estimated effects. Lastly, we can encompass the result 
of a small positive, long-run relationship between the divorce rate and the FLFPR found by 
Bremmer and Kesselring (2004) for the years 1960 to 2001. But we show that there are in fact 
two cointegrating equations for this time period and the dominant one of the two indicates a 
negative relationship between the divorce rate and the FLFPR. This result again fully supports 
our main conclusion that female participation in higher education or in the labor force lowers the 
divorce rate in the long run. 
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Table A1: OLS Estimates, 1949-2006 
(Substituting Female Labor-Force Participation) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff.  p-value 
         
constant 0.8662 0.001 -0.5422 0.523 -0.7412 0.378 -0.7589 0.388 
divorce (-1) 0.8750 0.000 0.8759 0.000 0.8807 0.000 0.8987 0.000 
flfpr -1.7959 0.000 4.3703 0.233 4.6767 0.193 4.9683 0.196 
flfpr
 2
   -6.2563 0.082 -6.3264 0.073 -6.6879 0.079 
pill 0.6101 0.000 0.5207 0.000 0.4719 0.001 0.4588 0.001 
inflation 0.0100 0.117 0.0078 0.211 0.0105 0.096 0.0063 0.321 
ygrowth 0.0095 0.080 0.0330 0.016 0.0586 0.004 0.0130 0.611 
ygrowth
2
   -0.0039 0.049 -0.0048 0.017 0.0008 0.776 
das*ygrowth       0.1809 0.012 
Δunemp     0.0470 0.086 0.0527 0.048 
Vietnam (-1) 0.1940 0.000 0.1431 0.002 0.1334 0.000 0.1311 0.000 
Korea       -0.0138 0.277 
        
Notes: (-1) denotes a lag order of one. Δ is the first-difference operator.  The models presented here are the same as 
those shown in Table 4, but with the FLFPR substituted for female participation in higher education.   
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Table A2: OLS Estimates, 1949-2006 
(Dependent Variable: Divorces per 1,000 Married Couples) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
         
constant 3.0551 0.001 -3.5572 0.217 -3.5053 0.220 -3.7463 0.245 
divorce (-1) 0.8400 0.000 0.8383 0.000 0.8395 0.000 0.8512 0.000 
fem_ratio -5.2380 0.010 25.6045 0.049 23.5841 0.069 25.3492 0.091 
fem_ratio
 2
   -33.6512 0.014 -30.7080 0.025 -32.7200 0.039 
pill 2.5074 0.000 2.3625 0.000 2.2672 0.000 2.2038 0.000 
inflation 0.0716 0.005 0.0530 0.036 0.0626 0.017 0.0516 0.058 
ygrowth 0.0428 0.065 0.1014 0.087 0.1870 0.034 0.0500 0.669 
ygrowth
2
   -0.0108 0.201 -0.0142 0.107 0.0027 0.834 
das*ygrowth       0.5309 0.090 
Δunemp     0.1542 0.183 0.1696 0.152 
Vietnam (-1) 0.7056 0.000 0.5151 0.000 0.5007 0.000 0.4870 0.001 
Korea       -0.0400 0.482 
         
Unadjusted R
2
  0.9945  0.9955  0.9957  0.9959  
Adjusted R
2
  0.9939  0.9948  0.9949  0.9950  
Log-likelihood    -24.129  -18.439  -17.360  -15.461  
AIC    62.258  54.879  54.719  54.922  
SBC  76.681  73.443  75.324  79.647  
HQC  67.876  62.102  62.745  64.553  
         RESET  0.029  0.440  0.428  0.563 
Homoskedasticity 0.020  0.329  0.465  0.383 
Normality  0.919  0.058  0.031  0.129 
Autocorrelation LM(1) 0.667  0.447  0.529  0.232 
Autocorrelation LM(2) 0.635  0.739  0.769  0.467 
Autocorrelation LM(3) 0.477  0.340  0.557  0.628 
ARCH (1)  0.297  0.386  0.288  0.243 
ARCH (2)  0.508  0.701  0.563   0.535 
ARCH (3)  0.801  0.722  0.638  0.474 
Quandt LR (max)  <0.01  >0.10  >0.10  >0.05 
Harvey-Collier (cusum) 0.017  0.956  0.626  0.693 
        Notes: (-1) denotes a lag order of one.  AIC stands for the Akaike Information Criterion, SBC for the Schwarz-
Bayesian Criterion, HQC for the Hannan-Quinn Criterion; RESET is Ramsey’s test for correct functional form; 
Homoskedasticity is White’s test; Normality is a test for normality of the residuals; the null of no autocorrelation at 
various lag lenths is tested with the Breusch-Godfrey test; ARCH tests the null of no relationship between the current 
error variance and its past values; Quandt LR tests for the lack of structural breaks (Stock and Watson 2003); and 
Harvey-Collier tests parameter stability using cumulated recursive residuals.  
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Table A3: Least Squares Estimates, 1929-2006, HAC Covariance Matrix 
(Dependent Variable: Divorces per 1,000 Married Couples) 
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
 coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
       constant -7.7222 0.003 -6.9134 0.011 -5.9049 0.011 
divorce (-1) 0.7442 0.000 0.7171 0.000 0.7978 0.000 
fem_ratio 52.9385 0.000 46.2748 0.000 38.1299 0.001 
fem_ratio
2
 -66.2416 0.000 -57.5174 0.000 -47.0461 0.000 
pill 3.9318 0.004 4.0025 0.002 2.7403 0.008 
inflation -0.0082 0.810 0.0317 0.392 0.0539 0.076 
ygrowth -0.0844 0.133 0.1347 0.065 0.0815 0.265 
ygrowth
2
 -0.0054 0.008 -0.0175 0.000 -0.0141 0.001 
das*ygrowth   -0.3827 0.016 -0.3191 0.012 
Δ unemp -0.2413 0.020 -0.1340 0.028 -0.1679 0.029 
WWII 3.8358 0.000 4.6067 0.000 3.6764 0.000 
WWII
2
 -1.1111 0.000 -1.4126 0.000 1.1095 0.000 
Vietnam (-1) 0.5830 0.000 0.5993 0.000 0.5340 0.000 
Korea 0.1058 0.001 0.0747 0.014 0.0471 0.203 
d47     -2.8496 0.000 
       
Unadjusted R
2
  0.9905  0.9919  0.9939  
Adjusted R
2
  0.9887  0.9902  0.9925  
Log-likelihood    -59.341  -53.546  -42.713  
Akaike    144.682  135.091  115.425  
Schwarz Bayesian  175.151  167.905  150.582  
Hannan-Quinn  156.869  148.216  129.487  
       RESET  0.208  0.061  0.073 
Homoskedasticity  0.000  0.001  0.017 
Normality  0.001  0.077  0.155 
Autocorrelation LM(1)  0.105  0.431  0.138 
Autocorrelation LM(2)  0.206  0.543  0.218 
Autocorrelation LM(3)  0.291  0.656  0.295 
ARCH (1)  0.001  0.010  0.958 
ARCH (2)  0.001  0.026  0.447 
ARCH (3)  0.004  0.051  0.633 
Quandt LR (max)  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01 
Harvey-Collier (CUSUM)  0.903  0.468  0.438 
       Notes: (-1) denotes a lag order of one.  Δ is the first-difference operator.  AIC stands for Akaike Information 
Criterion; SBC stands for the Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion; HQC is the Hannan-Quinn Criterion; RESET is 
Ramsey’s test for correct functional form; Homoskedasticity is White’s test; Normality is a test for non-
normality of the residuals, and uses normality as the null hypothesis; the tests for autocorrelation are the 
Bruesch-Godfrey tests for higher-order autocorrelation; ARCH tests for a relationship between the current error 
variance and its past values; Quandt LR tests for structural breaks; Harvey-Collier tests for parameter stability.    
 
- 54 - 
 
 
Table A4: Cointegration and VECM Results, 1929 to 2006 
(Dependent Variable: Divorces per 1,000 Married Couples) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
























  62.762 
(12.275) 
    
Cointegration Trace Test    
p-values:    
  null of rank = 0  0.000 0.001 0.000 
  null of rank = 1  0.139 0.284 0.321 
    
Statistics and Specification Tests of VECM    
Restricted Log-likelihood 369.549 370.292 372.119 
SBC -8.303 -8.323 -8.373 
HQC -8.888 -8.908 -8.958 
R
2
 divorce equation 0.660 0.688 0.702 
R
2
 second equation 0.601 0.575 0.582 
P-values of system tests:    
  ARCH (1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  ARCH (2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Ljung Box Q (18) 0.599 0.508 0.495 
  Autocorrelation (1)  0.266 0.093 0.042 
  Autocorrelation (2) 0.381 0.581 0.447 
  Normality 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: T-values are in parenthesis. 5 lags are used.  The p-values of the cointegration rank test are based on 
simulated values with 2,500 replications and random walks of length 400.  The effective sample is 1934 to 
2006.  Calculations are done in CATS in RATS, version 2 (Dennis et al. 2005). 
 
